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Summary  findings
Will the current wave of regional integration  is smali, the gains are large enough to offset the losses, so
arrangements lead to the w,-orld  being divided irnto  insiders are willing to accept new members. As the bloc
comnpeting  inward-looking tracing blocs? Or will ir lead  expands, the msiders' incentive for expanding decreases,
to a more oyen multilateral trading svstcm? Using a  eventually to zero. If only one regional integration
inulticountry political economy moodel,  and after having  arrangement were allowved  to form, insiders wotuld stop
shown that global free trade is optimal, Andriamananiara  accepting new members when half the world belonged to
investigates the possibility of achieving it through  the bloc.
regionalism.  The remaining outsiders would probably form a bloc
An outsider country considering entering a trading  of their  own, which would lead members of the original
bloc must weigh the tradeoff between the costs of opening  bloc to increase its size in anticipation of the creation of
its own market to more foreign competition and the gains  the second bloc. The threat of regionalism by outsiders
from getting better-  access to the bloc's preferenitial  would foster larger  regional integration arrangemnents.
Tm-arket. The gain of access is always larger. so an outsider  In this model, the typical  subgame perfect equilibrium
would always want to apply for membership in the  would be two blocs, one of them containing roughly
existing bloc. If the bloc policy is open membership, its  two-thirds of the world, the other containing roughly
expansion would result in global free trade.  one-third.
But if member countries can accept or reject new  Even if blocs form and merge simultaneously, yielding
members, expansion of the bloc is unlikely to yield  progressively larger symmetrical blocs, they would fail to
global free trade. When deciding whether to accept or  converge in a single bloc unless the external tariff were
reject a new member, an insider compares the gains from  Iow enough. In other words, global free trade could be
getting preferential access to t'e  niew  member's mnarket  achieved through  bloc expansion if trading blocs lowered
with the  losses from  hating  to share its original  "heir externial tariffs  when  abolishing  their internal  tariffs.
preferential market with the new}  mrenber. When the bloc
This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group  -is  part of a larger effort in the group to examine the
economics of regionalism and developrnent. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Lili Tabada, room MC3-333,  telephone 202-473-6896,  fax 202-522-1159,
Internet  address  ltabadaAworldbank.org.  Policy Research 'Working Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  http://
www.worldbank.org/html!dec!Publications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  author  may  be  contacted  at  soamiely
@4wami.umd.edu.  May 1999. (37 pagcs)
The  Policy  Research  Work'irg  Pape,  Serres disseminiates  the  findings  of  work  in  progress  to  encourage  the  exchange  of  ideas  about
development  issues. An  ob'ectiveof  i'e  series  is to get  the findings  out quickly,  even  if the presentations  are less than  fully  polished.  The
papers  carry the  names  of  bte asthors  and  should  be cited  accordiogly.  The findings,  interpretations,  a;d  conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are entirely  those  of  t,te  atbhos.  Theey do not  necessarily  represesot the  view  vof  the  World  Bank,  its  Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they  represent.
Produced  by the  Policy  Research  Disseminnation  CenterON THE SIZE AND NUMBER OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION ARRANGEMENTS:
A POLITICAL ECONOMY MODEL0
Soamiely  Andriamananjara*
Department  of  Economics
University  of  Maryland  at College  Park
'I  am grateful to Prof  Arvind Panagariya, Maurice Schiff, and the seminar participants at the
University of Maryland and at ERS/USDA for helpful comments.
Please direct all correspondence to Soamiely Andriamananjara, 3405-01 Tulane Drive,
Hyattsville, MD 20783, Tel (301) 422 4126, Fax (202) 522-1159, E-mail:
soamiely(wamr.umd.edu.Non-Technical Summary
The last two decades have seen a rapid proliferation of Regional Integration Arrangements
(RIAs).  Concurrently, regionalism has re-emerged as a major trade policy issue in many
developing countries.  Due to their discriminatory nature, RIAs can be welfare reducing for
the excluded countries, for the world as a whole, and even for the member countries as they
divert resources away from their most efficient uses.  This would even be worse if the world
became divided into a number of competing trading blocs.
It  is then perfectly  legitimate  for both  economists and  policymakers to  worry  about the
effects of this recent trend on the global trading system.  Is the current wave of regionalism
going to lead to a division of the world into a number of competing inward-looking blocs?
Or is it going to lead to a more open multilateral trading system?  This paper addresses these
issues using a multi-country political economy model.  Having established at the outset that
global free trade is optimal and that it is initially feasible  as a one-shot  game, the paper
investigates the possibility of achieving it through the regionalism approach. The goal is to
determine the likely equilibrium size and number of RIAs.
The paper first looks at the case where countries move sequentially (i.e., one by one).  It
studies in some detail the incentives for RIA expansion by looking at both the non-members'
desire to join the bloc or start forming their own bloc and the members'  incentives to accept
new members.  For an outsider country contemplating entry to  a trading bloc, the choice is
determined by  the trade-off between  the costs  of  opening up  one's  own  market to  more
foreign  competition, on the one hand,  and the gains from  obtaining  better access  to  the
bloc's preferential market on the other hand.  It is shown that the latter part (the access gain)
is always  larger, so that  an  outsider would  always want  to  apply for membership to  the
existing bloc.  Hence, if the bloc had open membership policy, its expansion would result in
global free trade.
At  the  other end  of  the  table,  if  member  countries  can choose  to  accept  or reject new
members (i.e., if membership were selective), the expansion of the bloc is not likely to yield
global  free trade.  When deciding  whether to  accept or reject a new  member,  an insider
compares the gains from getting preferential access to the new member's market, on the one
hand,  with  the losses for  having  to  share  its  original preferential  market  with  the  new
member on the other hand.  At small bloc size, the gains are large enough to offset the losses
so that the insiders are willing to accept new members.  As the bloc expands, however, the
insider's  incentives for further bloc expansion decrease and eventually go to zero.  If only
one RIA were allowed to form, then the insiders would stop accepting new members when
the bloc contains about half the world.
1But what happen to the remaining  outsiders? Instead of passively taking the abuse of the
existing bloc members,  the rejected countries  are likely to form a bloc of their own.  It is
shown  that the possibility of a second bloc would lead the members of the original bloc to
choose a bloc size which is larger than if only one bloc was allowed to exist.  Hence, the
threat of  regionalism  by  outsiders  would foster  larger RL4s.  In this  model, the  typical
subgame  perfect equilibrium  is two blocs with the first one consisting  of about two-thirds  of
the world while  the second one about  one-third.
Next, an alternative  and relatively  novel process is examined  whereby  blocs forn and merge
simultaneously  to yield progressively  larger symmetric  blocs.  Will this continue so as to
yield one single bloc, which is global free trade?  The paper shows that even in  this
simultaneous  bloc expansion,  the process fails to converge  to a single bloc except when the
external tariff happens  to be low enough. Here, we have an example of open regionalism,
based  on low external  tariffs,  leading to multilateral  free trade. One direct  policy implication
of this is that global  free trade can be achieved  through  bloc expansion  if trading blocs lower
their external  tariffs when they abolish  their internal  tariffs.
The key lesson  to take away from this paper is that there is a real possibility  that, left on its
own, the current  wave of regionalism  will not lead to global free trade. Additional  rules of
the game (preferably  in the context of the WTO) are required in order  to reach this goal: (i)
Allow only the formation of trading blocs that have open membership policy and/or (ii)
Allow only trading blocs that substantially  lower their external  tariffs when they eliminate
internal  tariffs.  As the practicality  of these propositions  is not evident,  vigorous  multilateral
efforts in trade liberalization  are meanwhile  needed  to achieve  a more liberal global  trading
system.
21.  Introduction
The recent proliferation  of Regional  Integration  Arrangements  (RIAs) has raised the question
whether  the arrangements  will serve  as building  blocks or stumbling  blocks  to global  free  trade.
In the present  paper,  I explore  this important  issue  by focusing  on two key questions. First, in
an incentive-theoretic  setting, can an RIA continue  to expand  until it encompasses  the entire
world?  And second,  if two or more trading blocs form simultaneously,  do they have an
incentive  to merge  so that eventually  the world turns  into a single  global  bloc?
The formation  and the expansion  of a trading  bloc  require  a "coincidence  of wants" among  all
the interested  parties. On one hand,  the outsiders  must want  to join the bloc while,  on the other,
the insiders  have  to be willing  to accept  new members. Assuming  that blocs  form sequentially,
my first objective  is to formulate  the incentives  of both  the RIA  members  and  the non-members
to form,  join or expand  a trading  bloc and to determine  the equilibrium  membership  size and
the equilibrium  number  of RIAs. My second  objective  is to study  a situation  where  blocs  form
simultaneously  in the incentive-theoretic  setting  and to explore  whether  the blocs merge into
ever-enlarging  blocs  such  that we are left with a single  bloc  at the end of the process.
Though  the literature  on the building  versus  stumbling  blocks  issue has been growing  rapidly,  it
is still in its infancy. The existing  contributions  can be divided  into two categories. In the first
category,  which may be called  the "endogenous  protection"  category,  we have papers  that ask
3whether the formation of an RIA leads to a higher or lower protection with respect to the
outside countries.  Papers by Richardson (1993), Panagariya and Findlay (1996), Bagwell and
Staiger (1997), Krishna (1998), and Levy (1997a, 1997b) fall in this category.  In the second
category, which can be termed the "endogenous expansion" category, we have papers whose
focus is on the expansion of blocs.  Papers by Baldwin (1995), Yi (1996) and Bond and
Syropoulos (1996) belong to this  category.  Since the present paper falls into the second
category, it is useful to summarize this set of papers.'
Using a political economy model a la Grossman and Helpman (1995), Baldwin (1995) shows
that the expansion of an RIA increases the incentives of the outsiders to apply for membership.
One direct implication of his result is that if membership was open, and if non-economic factors
against seeking entry were absent, regionalism would lead to global free trade. Baldwin' s
model is insightful but it tells only a part of the story since it fails to consider the incentives of
the current members to keep new members out of the arrangement.
Using analytical techniques from the non-cooperative theories of stable coalition structure, Yi
(1996) studies stable customs-union (CU) where the CUs are formed based on the traditional,
welfare-maximizing, optimal tariffs criterion. 2 He shows that the formation of a CU increases
'  Bhagwati and  Panagariya  (1996) and  Winters (1996) provide excellent  surveys of  the
literature on this subject.
2  Yi's  rich model uses  sophisticated and abstract rules  of  customs-union formation: Each
country announces an 'address' and the countries that announce the same address belong in the
same customs union.  In the  sequential-move version,  the first  country makes an  address
announcement.  After  observing the first announcement, the second country announces its
4the aggregate  welfare  of the members  but reduces  the welfare  of non-members.  Like Baldwin,
Yi finds that CUs are a stepping  stone toward global  free trade provided  the membership  is
open to all countries. But it turns out in his model  that under "unanimous-membership"  rule,
according  to which a CU allows entry of a new member  if and only if all existing members
agree  to admit  the new  member,  regionalism  can be a stumbling  block  to global  free  trade.
Bond and Syropoulos  (1996) explore the relationship  between  the size of trading blocs, the
market power of trading blocs (as captured  by the level of their optimal tariffs) and world
welfare  within  a differentiated-goods  model  similar  to that in Krugman  (1991). They show  that
a large increase  in the relative  size of a bloc enhances  its relative  market  power  and causes  the
welfare  of its country  members  to rise above  the free trade level. If bloc expansion  is driven  by
welfare  maximization,  blocs  will fail to expand  into a single  global  bloc in their  model.
In the present  paper, I present  a multi-country,  Coumot-oligopoly  model in which the bloc-
expansion  and merger  issues can be readily  analyzed. Because  the model  pennits the analysis
within a homogeneous-good  model, it retains simplicity  despite the presence  of multilateral
trade. A key feature  distinguishing  the analysis  from Yi or Bond and Syropoulos  is the role it
assigns  to producer  interests in the determination  of the outcomes. The political economy
framework  used is a stripped-down  multi-country  version of Grossman  and Helpman  (1995)
and is therefore  more closely  related  to Baldwin's approach  in that the incentives  of trading
preferred  address,  and so on. In the simultaneous-move  version,  countries  announce  addresses
at the same  time.
5blocs to expand or to merge are determined through a political process dominated by producers
rather than through welfare considerations as is more common in the literature.
Another distinguishing feature of the paper is that  I omit market power  or optimnal  tariffs
considerations (which are important aspects of Bond and Syropoulos and, to a lesser extent, Yi)
and take the external tariffs of trading blocs as exogenously fixed. This feature is more realistic
because blocs' external tariffs are in the real world bound by GATT's Article XXIYV. 3 It also
allows to separate the direct effects of intra-bloc trade liberalization from the effects of the
expanding bloc's  increased market power (as captured by higher optimal tariffs). 4 Given the
second best nature of regionalism, the direct effects of intra-bloc liberalization are not always
unambiguous.  Furthermore, I consider the issue of merger of blocs, which has been largely
neglected in the literature to date.
In Section 2, 1 introduce the notations and the structure of a basic model which could be thought
of as  a multi-country version of  Krishna (1998)'s  three country model. 5 At the  outset, I
3  There are other reasons for abstracting from optimal tariffs. First, countries, in practice,
rarely choose their tariffs for optimal tariff reasons.  Also, optimal tariffs derived in economic
models  have  been  shown  to  be  much  too  high  compared  to  the  actual  observed  levels
(Krugman, 1991).
4  Krugman (1993) disaggregates the welfare effects of regionalism and finds that the welfare
losses due to bloc expansion owe far more to trade diversion than to increases in the optimum
external tariff.
I In his three-country model, Krishna (1998) shows that the more trade diverting an FTA
between two countries, the more domestic support it will get.  He then demonstrates that the
formation  of  the  two-country  FTA  reduces  the  members'  incentives  for  multilateral
liberalization with the third country.  As interesting as it may seem, this result appears to be
mainly driven by the terminal condition which implies that, since no more trade diversion is
6establish that, from a world welfare perspective, global free trade is optimal if non-negative
tariffs are the only available policy instruments. However, the paper shows that even though it
is initially feasible as a one-shot game, global free trade may become unfeasible if some groups
of countries take the regionalism path.
In Section 3, I consider the case where countries move sequentially and show that, in this case,
only  one trading bloc will  form and  expand at any  given time. 6 The key  finding in  this
sequential bloc expansion process is that, though outsiders always want to join, at some point
the incentive of the member countries to take new members declines to zero before all countries
have been admitted.  This fact leads to the formation of a second bloc but in the absence of
inter-bloc cooperation to merge, the process cannot lead to the multilateral outcome.  Another
important result and contribution is that the anticipation of a second RIA being created leads
the members of the original group (which act as a Stackelberg leader) to choose a group size
larger than the one they would have chosen if only one bloc was allowed to form.  Two
trading blocs with one containing about two-thirds of the world and the other one-third will in
general be the resulting pattern of world trade.
possible by associating with the last non-member country, the member countries would have
no incentive to admit it in their FTA.  In order to get the full flavor of Krishna's  results, one
has to use more than three countries.
6  Starting from a symmetric equilibrium and to capture the change in "relative bloc size",
Bond and Syropoulos (1996) uses a different type of asymmetric bloc expansion in which
one bloc expands by drawing members symmetrically from each of the other blocs.  While
this approach seems to serve its purpose, one obvious drawback is that if we start from an
initial equilibrium where there is no bloc (or each country is a bloc itself), then the expansion
of one bloc directly yields global free trade.  Hence, the whole exercise is reduced to the
feasibility of multilateral trade liberalization.
7In Section  4, an alternative  and relatively  novel process  is considered  whereby  blocs  form and
merge simultaneously  to yield progressively  larger blocs. I determine  the stable number  and
size of the resulting  blocs via this process. In this simultaneous  bloc expansion,  the process
fails  to converge  to a single  bloc  except  when the external  tariff  happens  to be very low. Thus,
here we have an example of open regionalism,  based on low extemal tariffs, leading to
multilateral  free trade. Section  5 concludes.
2.  The Basic Model
Consider  a world with g similar countries. To economize  on notation,  I assume that there is
only one firm in each country.  All the firms in the world produce goods that are perfect
substitutes  for each other.  To simplify  the discussion,  I introduce  the notation  first. Let i and
j  (=1,  2, ..., g) be country  indices:
q,:  quantity  supplied  by firm from i toj's  market;
Pj:  equilibrium  price of the good inj's  market;
'T,:  profits  made by firm from i inj's  market;
t, :  specific  tariff imposed  by countryj on imports  from i;
c  :  constant  marginal  and average  costs of production.
8The  Demand  Side
The aggregate  utility in country  j  is assumed  to have a quasi-linear  form: Uj(K,  Qj) = K +
g
(AQj - Qj 2/2), where Q,=  q  is the total sales of the good in country  j's  market,  and K is
the consumption  of a competitively  produced  numeraire  good, which is assumed  to be freely
traded  to settle  the balance of trade. Hence,  the price of the good in country  j can be written
as a linear  function  of the total sales in that country:  Pj =  A - Qj.
The Supply  Side
Uniform non-discriminatory  specific tariffs are imposed by all countries on imports from
other countries  that do not have a special  arrangement  with them. The specific  tariffs simply
add on to the marginal costs of firms, whose effective  marginal  costs of exports  then become
c +  t,.  As in Brander and Krugman's (1983)  reciprocal  dumping model, the markets in the
different countries are perfectly segmented  so that each firm regards each country as  a
separate  market and chooses its optimal  quantity  for each country separately. Welfare  gains
from trade come from the increased  competition  that trade introduces. I assume  that firms  do
not incur any transportation  cost in exporting  the good. In each market,  firms act as Cournot
players and maximize  their profits taking  other firms' output as given, and all the g firms are
choosing  their quantities  simultaneously.  Country  i's firm, when choosing  the quantity  that it
would export  to countryj, solves  the following  problem:
9m,ax  qj.  [A -Qj  -(c  +t, )] jqx
which yields the Nash equilibrium output level:
g
(A-c)  +k=I  t
q,=I  +  2=  -tj
1+g  1+g
The values of A,  c, g,  and  tj  will be restricted in  such a way that no firm will produce
negative amount.  Formally, this restriction, which will be referred to throughout the paper
(under the expression "valid parameters"), is written as:
(A-c) Žg. t.
The total consumption in countryj  is therefore given by:
g.(A-C)  k1
(1)  Q  =  i+g  1+g
The corresponding profit for the firm in country i selling in countryj  is:
g
(2)  '  (qi) 2 [(A-c)  +  k=I  2.
i  i  I+  g  1+g 
The total profit that the representative firm makes is simply the sum of all the profits that it
makes in all the g countries:
g
~,  ~,  ~[(A  c)k=  i  2
j=1  j=1  1+g  I+g  J
10National and World Welfare
Country i's  welfare consists of the domestic consumer surplus (CS), the domestic firm's




Assume that non-negative  import tariff is the only available policy instrument, it can be
computed  that world welfare,  which is the sum of all the national  welfare (WwO,,d  = XE  ), is
maximized  under  global  free trade, that is when t, = O  for all countries.'
Political Economy
Even though global free trade is optimal in this model, it is not always necessarily  the
equilibrium  outcome  in the presence  of political  distortions  and non-cooperative  behavior  by
the countries.  Modeling the formulation of trade policy is not a  straightforward  task.
However, it is clear and widely accepted that producers are given extra weight and are
playing a decisive  role in shaping a country's policy stance.'  This is a legitimate premise
given that they are more easily organized than consumers. The policymaker's objective
function  is written:
g
VI =aW  +(I-a):,T,,  OSa<1,
k=l
7  It should  be noted that due to oligopolistic  distortions,  global free trade is a second best
policy. Unconstrained  first best policy  would  include subsidies  or negative  tariffs.
8 See e.g., Baldwin (1993), Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (1996), Panagariya and Findlay
(1996),  Krishna (1998).  In an often quoted  paper, Grossman  and Helpman  (1995) model  the
politics of FTAs  by taking  account  of the influence  exerted  by organized  groups.
11where (1-a) is the relative weight that the policymaker assigns to the producers'  profits.  Due
to their large number, consumers usually find it hard to effectively lobby for their desired
policies. In this paper, I will rely on the assumption that the producers'  profits play a decisive
role in determining whether a country will form, join, or expand a RIA (i.e., a = 0).  The
gains and losses of domestic producers therefore drive trade policy decisions. 9 Simulations
using different values of a reveal that relaxing this simplifying assumption does not affect the
main qualitative results of the paper.
Common External Tariffs
Numerous  authors  (e.g., Krugman  (1991), Panagariya and  Findlay (1994),  and Cadot, de
Melo and Olarreaga (1996)) have argued that integrated countries have an incentive to raise
their common external tariff.  Bhagwati (1993) also argues that in models where producers
play a decisive role, the formation and expansion of a RIA is likely to increase protection
against non-members.  In  this  paper, however,  it is assumed  that  the levels  of  common
external  tariffs  remain  the  same  before  and  after  the  formation  of  a  RIA.  A  simple
interpretation of this is that the RIAs adhere to  GATT's  Article XXIV'°. Accordingly, we
write:  t,  = 0  if i  = j  or if both if i and j  are members of the same regional  arrangement;
t,  = t > 0 otherwise.
This  assumption has  some supporting evidence.  In a  survey of the European pressure
groups, Vaubel (1994) notes that only seven out of the 500 or so lobbies represent consumers
or environmentalists. [Quoted in Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga, 1996]
123.  Asymmetric RIA Formation: Sequential Move
In this section,  countries  are assumed  to move sequentially,  one by one, in an exogenously
given order. The objectives  are (i) to look at the incentives  of different countries  to form,  to
join, or to expand  a regional  grouping and (ii) to determine  the equilibrium  group size for a
given entry condition. Assume first that there are B trading  blocs in the world.  Denote  hb
B
the size of the b-th bloc so that Ihb  = g.  If a country  i does not belong  to a RIA then  hi =
b=l
1. Using  equation  (2), the profits earned  by the firm of a representative  country  belonging  to
a representative  bloc b in its own and its partners' markets  are written as:
hbA  - c + (g  - hb).t 1 2
On the other  hand, the profits  that the firm earns  in the non-partners'  markets  are:
B  A-  C-(hd  +l)-t  2
d￿b
Hence, the total profits that the representative  firm, which are simply the sum of all the
profits that it makes in all the g countries  are:
(4)  rJL(h  ) =h  [  C+(g-hb)t  +[  [A -c  -(hd + 1).t2
dob
Fixing the external  tariff greatly simplifies  the analysis. It must be noted however that in
practice  Article XXIV  has been notable for its weak enforcement. Moreover,  there are many
13The next proposition follows directly from the above equation.
Proposition 1. A firm belonging to a large RIA makes more profits than one belonging to a
small RIA if the two RIAs coexist.
Proof  Suppose that p  and q are two coexisting RIAs such that hp > hq and hp + hq < g.
Under valid parameter values, it can be computed that
H(hp) - f(hq)  = (hp - hq).t.[2(A - c - (hp +  hq).t) +  (g -1).t] >  O
A direct implication of Proposition I is that a country would always apply for membership to
the largest existing RIA.  This, in turn, implies that starting from a situation where there exist
no RIAs, if one RIA formed between two countries, all the remaining countries would want
to join that RIA rather than form their own RIA.  Hence, the first created RIA would expand
as long as the insiders are willing to let more members in.  In what follows, I study in some
detail the expansion process of that RIA and the changes in the incentives of the insiders and
the outsiders as the group size increases.
Assume  now that  h  countries belong  to  that  particular  RIA,  and thus  have  zero tariffs
between them.  The total profits of the firm in country i are simply the sum of all the profits
that it makes in all the g countries.  If the country is an insider, then the total profits are:
protection instruments, such as antidumping, which are GATT consistent.
14(5)  A-c+  (h)  h.(  c+(g  -h).t) 2 +(g-h).(  A-c-2t  2 in(h  h(  +g  l+g
The first term on the right hand side (RHS)  of (5) denotes  the profit that firm i makes in the h
member countries' markets (including  its own).  An increase in the club size has the first
order effect of increasing the number of markets in which the firm receives preferential
treatment and has cost advantage  vis-a-vis  the outsiders. Note, however, that as a second
order effect, the squared  quantity decreases  as h increases.  This reflects a "thinning-of-the-
market": as the club size increases,  the existing  market is shared  by more  firms and oligopoly
power for each firm declines. The second term is the profit that firm i makes in the (g-h)
outsiders.
The next proposition  follows:
Proposition  2. Multilateral  free trade is initially  feasible.
Proof  Starting  from h = 1, a one-shot  multilateral  trade liberalization  (reduction  of t to zero)
increases  the profits of all the firms  (for valid parameter  values):
Iln(hl  =  1,t=O)-  I=l,t)=g.(Ac  )2  [h  A -c+(g-h).t)2  +(gh)  A-c-2t2
1+g  1+g  1+g
(g - 1).t.[2.(A - c) - (3 + g). t] >.
(1+g) 2 >
15One of the results of this model is that even though global free trade is feasible ex ante, it
may become  politically  impossible once some  group of countries  have embarked  on the
regionalism path.
On the other hand, if country i is an outsider then its firm's  profit is:
A-c+(g-  1).t)2  A  -A-c-(h+1).t)2  A  - c -2t) 2
The first term on the RHS is the profit that the firm makes in its own market.  The second
term is the profits made in the h insiders.  As h increases, the squared quantity decreases due
to the increase in cost disadvantage vis-a-vis the insiders. The third term is the profits made
in the (g-h-1) remaining outsiders.
Proposition  3.  An increase  in the RIA  size unambiguously decreases the  profits  of the
remaining outsiders.
Proof  It can be computed that for valid parameter values:
dHl'. (h)  _  (A-c-(h+1)t) 2 -(A-c-2t) 2 -2.t.h(A-c-  (h+l)t)
dh  (1+-g) 2 (+  g) 2
This implies that even if the insiders strictly adhere to GATT's Article XXIV by not raising
the level of their external tariffs the formation or the expansion of a club unambiguously hurt
16the remaining  outsiders. Hence, the current provision of the WTO regarding  RIAs is not
sufficient  to protect  outside  producers  from losses in profits.
Having computed  the profits as functions  of the club size,  we can now study the incentives  of
both insiders  and outsiders  to form,  join or expand  an regional  grouping.
With respect  to the outsiders,  the following  proposition  follows  from Proposition  1.
Proposition  4.  If the RIA has an open door or open membership  policy, global  free trade
will be obtained".
Proof. Outsiders  would  want to join the club  as long as  rlI  (h) - r'  (h) >  0 which  is always
the case. (See Proposition 1)
At the other end of the table, when contemplating  whether  to accept a new member or not,
insiders  look at the change  in its total profit due to entry of the new member  or,
dal' (h)  (A-c  +(g-h).t) 2 -(A  -c-2t) 2 2th.(A-c+(g-h).t)
dh  (l  +  g) 2 (l  + g) 2
"  This type of result has led some economists (e.g., Yi (1996) and Snape (1992)) to
recommend  the addition of a clause to Article XXIV specifying  that FTAs must let in any
country that wants to join. Requiring  such a liberal accession clause in free trade area and
customs union agreements would ensure that these clubs within the  GATT club would
17As was already  discussed, the effects of an  increase in  h on the  insider's  profits  can be
divided into two subeffects.  The first term on the RHS denotes the gains from the increased
size of the market in which the firm receives preferential treatment.  The effective marginal
cost of exporting to the new member has decreased.  The second term reflects the "thinning"
of the market.  Basically, as h increases the pie becomes larger on the one hand but on the
other hand more people share it.
Proposition 5. Under selective membership condition (i.e., the insiders can select whether or
not to accept new members), global free trade will not be the outcome of the sequential bloc
expansion process.
Proof  The simplest way to prove this result is to show that if only one group exists and if
the group size is around g (i.e., global free trade), an  expansion of the RIA will decrease
insider's profits:
dfl1 (h)|  (A-c) 2 -(A-c-2t) 2 -2.t.g.(A-c)
dh  (1 + g)2
-4t 2 - (2g - 4)(A - c)t
-(l+g) 2 <0
In the case where only one bloc was allowed to exist, the insider's  preferred group size will
be the club size, denoted h *, at which,
further, rather than threaten, the aims of GATT itself.  Many economists (e.g.,  Srinivasan
18drI  (h)
dh
It can be computed  that:
*  2.(A-c+gt)-V(A_c+gt)2  +3(A-c-2t) 2
h=  3t
If the outsiders did not have the option of forming a second bloc (i.e., only one bloc was
allowed to form), no more new entry will be accepted  beyond this point and h* will be the
resulting  bloc size. For illustrative  purpose,  the model is simulated  using specific  parameter
values.  Four cases (with 30 countries) are depicted in Figure 1.  The figure confirms  the
result that outsiders  will be hurt by the expansion  of a RIA. It also shows that the profits of
the insiders initially increase with the enlargement of the RIA, but when the group size
reaches  about half of the world (around 15 or 16 out of 30 countries),  profits begin to decline
with any further  expansion. This result is robust  to reasonable  changes  in the parameters  of
the model.
The rejected  outsiders,  instead  of being passive,  will gain  from forming  a countervailing  RIA.
As this second  RIA  expands,  those  that are left out of it will become  worse off and will apply
for membership.  At the same  time, the enlargement  of the second  RIA will hurt the members
of the first one.  However  the members  will not have the incentive  to drop out of their RIA
and seek membership  to the second  RIA  since they already  belong  to the larger RIA. Instead,
(1996),  Lawrence  (1996)  have questioned  the jracticality of such suggestion.in some instances,  they may find it in their interest to expand  their RIA further,  preempting
the creation  and the expansion  of the second  bloc. In a Stackelberg  fashion,  they will try to
influence  the potential  size of countervailing  RIA by further  increasing  the size of theirs. In
doing so, they will consider,  on the one hand, the profit losses that they would experience  if
their RIA grew beyond h  * and, on the other hand, those that they would incur if the second
RIA expanded. If the latter  losses are larger,  then, the members  of the first bloc will be better
of expanding  their own bloc rather than letting the expansion  of the second one.  Formally,
let h 1 and h 2 be the size of respectively  the first and the second  bloc.  The threat of creation
and enlargement  of the second  RIA  will lead to the expansion  of the first one as long as:
(7)  *h  (h,  + l,h2)  2 Ih, (h,,k  + 1),
where Hr,  denotes the total profits of a member of the first bloc.  When (7) holds with
equality, the members of the original RIA would be indifferent between accepting new
members  and allowing  the second  RIA  to expand.
Due to segmented  market assumption,  the second group's preferred size is also h* for any
given size of the original  bloc. To see this, consider  the profit of a representative  member  of
a group of size h 2 when a first group of size h, already  exists:
A  A-c-(h 1 +l).t  2  2  A-c+2.t  2
Ilk  (h,Sh2  l 'I  1+g  ]  'h"  l+g  l+g  I
This is maximized  when h2 = h*.  Note however that the size of the second bloc can be
constrained the fact that there are only g  countries in the world, so that (g- hi) 2 h 2.
Accordingly,  the size of the countervailing  RIA is given by:
20h2= Min [h*, (g - hj)].' 2
Anticipating  this, the original  RIA (which  could be thought  of as the Stackelberg  leader) can
gain  by acting  strategically  and will keep expanding  as long as:
h1 , (hl + 1,g - (h 1 + 1)) 2 rI,(hh,g-h).
Intuitively,  this means that the first (or "leader")  RIA will expand  if the profit gains  obtained
by decreasing  the size of the second (or "follower") bloc offset the profit losses associated
with enlargement. Appendix 1 shows this intuition graphically.  The resulting sub-game
perfect  equilibrium  sizes of the two blocs  would  respectively  be:
2(A - c)(-1 +  3g) - (-1 + g.  (3 + 2g)).t  d
2(4(A - c) - (2 + g).t)
(1  +  g)(2(A - c) - t)
2(4(A - c) - (2 +  g).t)
It can be shown  that h, is larger than h 2 for valid parameter  values. For some given  parameter
values of A, g and c, the size of each RIA (i.e.,  h, and h2) is reported  in the following  table for
different  tariff  levels.
12 Recall that the simulations  reported in Figure 1 indicate  that h* is about half of the world,
which implies  that in this model  at most two blocs  will be created.
21Table 1: Sub-game Prefect RIA Sizes
A  =300,g  =  30,c  = 10
Specific Tariff (t)*  First RIA (hl)  Second RIA (h2)
1 (5.0%-5.3%)  22  8
2  (9.7%-10.6%)  22  8
3  (13.9%-15.9%)  21  9
4  (17.8%-21-2%)  21  9
5  (21.4%-26.6%)  21  9
6  (24.7%-31.9%)  20  10
7  (27.8%-37.2%)  20  10
8  (30.6%-42.5%)  20  10
9  (33.3%-47.9%)  19  11
The range  of the corresponding  ad-valorem  tariffs  (tIP)  are in parentheses.
The above table shows that the original RIA would end up with approximately two-thirds of
the world while the second one with  one-third.  The anticipation of the enlargement  of a
second RIA has led the members of the first group to choose a group size larger than what
they  would  have  chosen  if  only  one  bloc  was  allowed  to  form  or  if  they  did  not  act
strategically (which is half of the world).  Thus, the threat of regionalism will lead to a larger
RIA.  For instance, the threat of a large East Asian trading bloc (e.g., East Asian Economic
Caucus (EAEC)  might have  conceivably  led to  the talks  about the  enlargement  of both
NAFTA and the European Community.
Another result, which can also be shown analytically, is that the size of first RIA decreases
with the general tariff level.  This comes from the fact that in a protectionist environment,
giving up one's protected preferential markets by expanding the RIA size will cost more than
allowing another bloc to expand since access to that bloc was already restricted anyway.
224.  Symmetric  RIA Formation  and Expansion:  Simultaneous  Move
In the previous section, I showed that the profits of the countries that are left out of the RIA
unambiguously decline as the group size increases.  It was assumed that countries moved
sequentially, one at a time and that they will not start a new RIA until they are rejected from
an existing one.  More realistically, however, countries sometimes move simultaneously and
countries can, instead of applying for membership to an existing RIA, form their own.
In fact, real world experience suggests that negotiations about integration between a group of
countries can prompt other countries to  form a  group of their own and blocs  are created
simultaneously.  For instance, the creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
was a response to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC).  It can also be
said that Mercosur was established with a desire to balance NAFTA.  These blocs may then
have incentives to merge with each other as is exemplified by the talk about the FTAA.
This section  allows  for the possibility  that  countries are moving  simultaneously and not
sequentially as in the previous section.  The goal is to determine (i) the equilibrium number
of RIAs and (ii) the equilibrium size of each group.  For simplicity, I assume that there are g
= 2Z  (Z  E N)  identical countries in the world.  As in the previous section, there is only one
firm producing in each country and trade policy formulation is determnined  by the profits of
that firm.
23RIA formation  and further expansions  take place in many (but less than Z) stages described
as follows. In the first stage (Stage 1), each of the g countries  forms a RIA with one and only
one neighbor.  This results in gf2 RIAs with two countries in each.  In the second stage
(Stage  2), each of the g/2 RIAs  merges  with one and only one neighboring  RIA. This yields
g/4 RIAs with four countries  in each and so on. In the nl stage (Stage  n, n < Z), each of the
g/2n-'  RIAs decides  on whether or not to form a RIA with one neighboring  RIA. Due to the
assumed symmetry of the  model, the decisions will always be unanimous among the
members  and reciprocal  among  the RIAs. If merger is accepted,  it results in g/2' RIAs with
2n  countries  in each.  The evolution  of the integration  process  is shown  in Table  2.  '3
Table  2. Evolution  of Integration  Process
Possible  Stage  RIA  Number  RIA Size
0  g/ 20 1
1  g/2  2
2  g14  4
3  g/8  8
N  g/2n  2n
Z-1  2  2Z-1
Z  1  g=2Z
'3  Bond and Syropoulos  (1996) model symmetric  bloc expansion (or increase in "absolute
bloc size")  in a more abstract  way. They exogenously  divide  the world into B identical  blocs
with each bloc  consisting  of n = gIB countries. Then, they consider  the effects of a decrease
in the number  of blocs B.  Implicitly,  a decrease  in the number of blocs-say  from B to (B-
1)-implies that all B blocs are first dissolved,  and then the countries  recombine  to form B-1
blocs of gI(B-l). The approach in  the present paper is  simpler and conceptually  more
realistic.
24The RIAs  will keep on merging (i.e.,  moving  to the next stage) as long as their members  find
it worthwhile  to do so.  My goal is to determine  whether  or not the mergers will go on until
Stage  Z after  which  there is only one RIA with g members  left. If not, at which Stage  n* will
the mergers stop?  The answer to this question simultaneously  gives us the equilibrium
number of RIAs and the equilibrium  size of each one of them. Since, in this framework,  all
the countries  are identical  and their membership  situations  are all the same, we only need to
study the incentives  of one single  representative  country.
In analogy  to the previous  section  where  I used the terms insiders  and outsider,  I shall use in
this section  the terms partners and non-partners. Using (2), the profits that the firm of the
representative  country  makes at any Stage  n is written  as:
(8)  rl(Stage n) = 2  ( A-c  + (g-2))  + (  2n  )( A-c-(2"  +1)
~~gen,-~  l+g  l+g
The first term in the right hand side of (8) denotes the profits made in the 2n partner
countries  while the second  term denote  the profits  made in the (g - 2n) non-partner  countries.
The country's firm will support RIA  merger if and only if an increase  in n does not decrease
its  profits.  For  convenience,  denote  the  number  of  partners  as  N  =  2n  . Since  N  is
monotonically  increasing  in n, RIAs will keep on merging  as long as:
25dfI  (A-c  +(g-N)t) 2 - 2tN(A - c + (g - N)t)
(9)  dN  (1 +  g)
2 (1  + g)
2
(  +  c - (1  + N)t)2 + - 2t(g - N)(A  - c - (1 + N)t)  >0.
(1+  g)2 (1+ g)2
The effects of a merger can be decomposed into four effects.  The first terms on the RHS of
(9) is the increase in profits due to the increased number of partners while the second one is
the decline in the profits made in each of the partner countries.  A merger has the first order
effect of increasing the number of markets in which the firm receives preferential treatment
and has cost advantage vis-a-vis the non-partners. However, as a second order effect, there is
a  "thinning-of-the-market" in each of the partner markets:  as the club  size increases, the
existing market is shared by more firms and oligopoly power for each firm declines.  As I
stated in the previous section, the pie is becoming larger but it is also shared by more Tirms.
The third term on the right hand side reflects the decrease in the number of non-partners.
Finally, the fourth expression denotes another "thinning-of-the-market" as the profits that the
firm makes in each of the non-partners declines.
At early stages of the integration process (i.e., RIA size N is small), it can be seen from (9)
that the positive effect of a merger dominates the negative ones.  That is, the formation and
the mergers of the RIA are beneficial to the firms.  At later Stages, however, the negative
effects become more important and further mergers may end up hurting the firms. In fact, it
can be computed that  dN 2 =  +  g)  which is unambiguously negative.
26The model is simulated in  order to determnine  the equilibrium number and size of the
symmetric  RIAs for some given parameter  values. The representative  firm's profits, which
play the decisive  role in this model, is graphed  against the Stage number. We have 32 = 25
countries  in the world which  means that integration  can take place in five possible  stages. In
Stage 1, each of the 32 countries  forms an RIA with another  country  which  results in 16 RIAs
with two countries  in each. In Stage  2, each of the 16 RIAs merges  with another  RIA which
yields 8 RIAs with four countries  in each and so on.  In Stage 5, the two RIAs with 16
members  in each merge. The integration  process  will go as long as the RIA merger  increases
the profits of the representative  firm.
Four cases are shown in Figure 2.  Note first that in all the cases, global free trade (which
results from Stage 5) always dominates  the initial status quo in terms of the representative
firm's profits. This means that if the countries choose multilateral  liberalization  instead of
embarking  on the regional  integration  process,  then global  free trade is politically  feasible. It
turns out, however,  that taking the regionalism  path can make initially feasible  multilateral
free trade politically  unfeasible.
27In one of the four cases, in which the tariff is very low (t = I)",  the integration process goes
all the way to Stage 5 to yield global free trade. Rigorously, the integration process will yield
one super-RIA to which all the world's country belong if, and only if,
4(A - c)
g  <  g2 +2g+2
This  result  has  an  interesting implication:  If  the regional  integration  path is  undertaken
alongside or after the multilateral one so that the general level of MFN (or, in this case, inter-
bloc) tariffs worldwide is  low enough  (not necessarily zero), then the RIAs  will keep on
merging until all countries belong a single RIA.  Hence, if the global trading system is liberal
enough before the regional integration process, then the integration process described in this
section leads to global free trade.  We have here an example of "open regionalism" based on
low external tariffs leading to global free trade.
In the other three cases presented in Figure 2 (in fact for any t > 1.06), global free trade does
not appear: the integration process stops at Stage 4.  This means that if the intra-bloc tariffs
were not low enough, the equilibrium outcome would be two RIA with half of the world (16
countries in these cases) in each.
14  Recall that this is "specific tariff."  In this series of simulations, price level ranges between
19 and 27  and the ad-valorem tariff corresponding to t = 1 would be around 5%.
285.  Concluding  Remarks
This paper presents  a simple model of RIA formation  and expansion  using an oligopolistic
competition framework. At the  outset, I note that in  this model the  world welfare is
maximized  under global free trade. The political economy  framework  used in this paper is
one where producers  play a decisive  role in formulating  trade policy. Hence,  the analysis  is
mainly based on the producers' profits.  I look at two different types of endogenous RIA
expansion:  one sequential  (or asymmetric)  and one simultaneous  (symmetric). In both types,
I show  that bloc  expansion  is likely  to stop before  it reaches  global free trade.
I first look at the asymmetric  type where  only one RIA forms and expands  at any given  time.
I find, on the one hand, that an expansion  of a regional  grouping  always,  and unambiguously,
hurts the producers in countries that are left out even if the insiders do not change their
external  tariffs of the RIA as a result of integration. On the other hand,  the effects  of a club
expansion  on an insider's profits are positive for small club size but become  negative,  as the
club becomes large. This is consistent  with the "club theory" characteristics  of an RIA in
that congestion  and crowding  tend  to occur  as the number  of members  increases.
I also find that the equilibrium  group size depends on the entry condition of the RIA. The
club size will grow until it contains all the existing countries under "open membership"
condition.  This supports  the arguments  that under  open regionalism,  RIAs are stepping  stones
towards global  free trade. However,  when membership  is selective,  the expansion  of a RIA
29fails  to  lead  to  global  free  trade:  RIAs  are  stumbling blocks under  "selective-entry"
regionalism.  Before its size reaches global free trade, the member of the bloc would stop
accepting new members, which leads to the creation of a second bloc.  In this case, the RIA
structure would be two blocs with the first one containing about two-thirds of the world and
the second one third. An interesting result in this section is that in anticipation of the creation
of the second bloc, the forward looking members of the first bloc choose a larger bloc size
than that which they would have chosen if only one bloc was allowed to form, or if they were
not forward looking.
Next, I look at the symmetric type of integration process where more than one RIA form. In
this  case,  a  number  of  RIAs  form  symmetrically and  keep  on merging  as  long  as  the
producers in each country find merger to be profitable.  At early stages of the integration
process,  a  merger  benefits  producers  as  the  size  of  the  market  in  which  they  receive
preferential treatment  increase.  At later stages, however, mergers may end up hurting the
firms as more and more firms share the preferential accesses.  I find that, although global free
trade is always politically feasible in a one-shot multilateral  liberalization, it may become
unfeasible when the regional integration path is taken.  Under most circumstances, the world
trading system will be stuck with two large symmetric RIAs as firms will resist any further
merger.  It should be noted that if the incidence of MFN or intra-bloc tariffs is low enough,
then the blocs will keep on merging until global free trade is obtained.  Thus, here we have an
example of open regionalism, based on low external tariffs, leading to multilateral free trade.
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34Figure 1: Firms' Profits in Asymmetric RIA Expansion
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Note: The corresponding  ad-valorem  tariffs vary according  to the group size but are ranging  from 5%
to 5.3% for t= 1; from 13.9%  to 15.9%  for t= 3; from 24.7%  to 31.9% for t= 6; and from 33.3%  to
47.9%  for t = 9.
35Figure 2: Representative Firm's Profits in Symmetric RIA Expansion
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36Appendix 1. Stackelberg Game with Original Bloc as Leader.
Figure  Al.  Reaction  Functions  and Indifference  Curves
h2
g  G  :RI
hi+h 2 =g
hh  h,
Figure Al  shows how the members of the first RIA can gain by acting as a Stackelberg
leader.  It plots a  series of indifference  curves for the first bloc, in which a southward
movement  means increased  profits. The "unconstrained  reaction functions"  of the each bloc
with respect  to the size of the other are also shown (R 1R, and R 2R2). Note first that if there
was no constraint on the total number of countries (g), or if the first bloc did not behave
strategically,  then the equilibrium  RIA structure  would be point X (i.e., each bloc chooses
h*). However,  given the constraint  on the size of the second  bloc ((g- hl) 2 h2), the effective
reaction function  of the second bloc becomes  kinked at g/2 and is represented  by R2XG. It
can clearly  be seen that, the Stackelberg  leader can be better off by choosing  point Y rather
than point X.  By increasing  its size beyond its preferred  level, the first bloc can gain by
effectively  decreasing  the size of the second  bloc. Hence,  in the subgame  perfect  equilibrium
h, will be bigger  that h*.
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